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GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF HEALTH-CARE
DRUGS OF QUESTIONABLE EFFICACY
INTRODUCTION
Untested drugs of questionable effectiveness have long been
promoted in the underground health-care market with claims of
curing everything from arthritis to cancer. At present the most
widely publicized and most controversial of these illicit health-care
drugs is a substance called laetrile, also known as Vitamin B17 and
amygdalin. 1 Proponents of laetrile claim the substance is bene-
ficial in arresting and curing cancer.2 However, nearly the entire
1. M. CULBERT, VITAMIN B17, at 53 (1974). See United States v. General
Research Laboratories, 397 F. Supp. 197, 198 (C.D. Cal. 1975). Laetrile is
not the first and certainly will not be the last of these controversial drugs
of questionable efficacy. Several years ago a drug known as Krebiozen pre-
cipitated a series of suits because its proponents demanded the right to ob-
tain the substance for health-care purposes. E.g., Durovic v. Richardson,
479 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 944, reh'g denied, 414 U.S.
1088 (1973); Rutherford v. American Medical Ass'n, 279 F.2d 641 (7th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1043, reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 975 (1968); Tutoki
v. Celebreeze, 375 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1967). See also 17 CAL. AD. CODE §
10400.7 (1967) (administration of Krebiozen made illegal). Prior to the
Krebiozen cases, a substance called Mucorhicin was the center of a legal
and medical controversy. E.g., United States v. Nutrition Serv., Inc.,
227 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1965). See
also 17 CAL. AD. CODE § 10400.5 (1967) (administration of Mucorhicin made
illegal).
2. J. Scimmr, AT -omu.ys' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE 127-28 (1974), defines
amygdalin as "a complex substance, generally a glycoside, occurring in bit-
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medical establishment, including the American Cancer Society and
the American Medical Association, dismisses laetrile as worthless
in the treatment of cancer."
Because laetrile has not been approved for shipment in interstate
commerce 4 and because its administration for cancer treatment is
illegal in some states,5 thousands of American cancer patients have
gone to Mexico for laetrile treatments." The popularity of laetrile
has attracted considerable attention from the news media, 7 and
government authorities have started a concerted effort to curtail
both the importation and administration of laetrile.8 As a result,
ter almond, cherry laurel and other plants." The term IaetTile is not listed.
According to M. CULBERT, VITAMN B17, at 22 (1974), laetrile is a brand
name for a purified, crystallized, freeze-dried form of amygdalin. For some
of the claims made in behalf of laetrile, see id. at 22-25.
3. TimE, April 12, 1971, at 80. The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) is attributed as stating that there is no evidence, either preclinical or
clinical, that laetrile would be effective for cancer treatment. Id. See also
N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1971, at 52, col. 3.
4. Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 36-37 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 540
F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976).
5. E.g., 17 Cal. Ad. Code § 10400.1 (1963).
6. M. CULBERT, VITAMIN B17, at 22 (1974). Physicians at one popular
laetrile treatment center in Tijuana, Mexico, claim they treat 120 patients
daily. San Diego appears to be a major traffic center of laetrile because
substantial quantities of the drug are manufactured in Mexico. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 3, 1975, at 36, col. 3; San Diego Union, March 18, 1976, § A, at 8, col. 5.
7. The San Diego Union-Tribune ran approximately 75 laetrile-related
stories in 1975 alone. James J. Kilpatrick, a nationally syndicated newspa-
per columnist, has written several articles about laetrile. E.g., Los Angeles
Times, Dec. 17, 1975, § II, at 7, col. 1. For other articles on laetrile, see
id., Feb. 20, 1976, § I, at 2, col. 6; id., Jan. 9, 1976, § 1, at 32, col 1; id.
Feb. 4, 1975, § I, at 2, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1975, at 48, col. 1; id.,
Feb. 28, 1971, at 52, col. 3.
8. The principal federal case is United States v. McNaughton, Cr. No.
7600448 (S.D. Cal., filed May 20, 1976). Sixteen individuals and three Mexi-
can companies were charged with taking part in a conspiracy to smuggle
laetrile into the United States. The charges, brought under 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1970) (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the government) and
18 U.S.C. § 545 (1970) (smuggling goods into the United States), were not
directly based on the fact that laetrile is an unapproved health-care drug.
Therefore, the health-care issue apparently will not be raised at trial. The
defendants are accused of being involved in a multi-million dollar smug-
gling operation intending to supply thousands of people in the United States
with laetrile. For accounts of the indictments, see Los Angeles Times, May
26, 1976, § I, at 3, col. 4 and id., May 27, 1976, § I, at 2, col. 6; N.Y. Times,
May 26, 1976, at 1, col. 1; and San Diego Union, May 26, 1976, § A, at 2,
col. 7.
The principal state cases dealing with the administration of laetrile are
People v. Privitera, 55 Adv. Cal. App. 3d Supp. 39, 128 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1976),
in at least six cases individuals have sought injunctive relief against
the federal government in order to obtain laetrile for health-care
purposes.9 Only one case, Rutherford v. United States,10 thus far
has ruled in favor of the individuals requesting relief.
In Rutherford, a federal district court granted temporary injunc-
tive relief to the plaintiff and allowed him to transport laetrile in
interstate commerce in order to obtain personal supplies of the drug
for a limited time." The court reasoned that the statutory
scheme of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 193812
denied "freedom of choice" to an individual who as a cancer
patient had used laetrile instead of traditional methods of cancer
treatment. The district court concluded that this denial violated
due process.' 8 The constitutional issue was not reached on appeal;
rather, the court of appeals upheld the preliminary injunction while
remanding the case so that adequate evidence could be produced
to support the new drug determination of laetrile.1
4
and People v. Turner, Cr. No. 032978 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego County,
Dec. 16, 1975), appeal docketed, 4 Cr. No. 8323 (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 9, 1976).
9. Keene v. United States, Civ. No. 76-0382-H (S.D. W. Va., filed Oct.
12, 1976); Keyes v. United States, No. 76-630 (W.D. Wash., Sept. 29, 1976);
Contreras v. United States, Civ. No. S-76-485 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 23, 1976);
Salzman v. United States, No. 75-H-2150 (S.D. Tex., Jan. 9, 1976); Oglevie
v. United States, Civ. No. 75-969 (D. Colo., filed Sept. 11, 1975); Rutherford
v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Okla. 1975), remanded, 542 F.2d
1137 (10th Cir. 1976).
10. 399 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Okla. 1975), remanded, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th
Cir. 1976).
11. Id. at 1215.
12. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (Supp. V 1975).
13. 399 F. Supp. at 1213. Apparently plaintiff Rutherford used laetrile
for cancer treatment as an alternative to surgery. Rutherford claimed that
he was cured of cancer through the use of laetrile after visiting a Tijuana
laetrile clinic. However, he claimed that his domestic supply of laetrile
had been halted by the arrest of his supplier. The court found that Ruther-
ford could not obtain laetrile without violating the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act. The court further found that laetrile was non-toxic when taken
in proper amounts and that the Food and Drug Administration had abdi-
cated its duty in failing to decide if laetrile should or should not be placed
in interstate commerce. It is especially interesting to consider the court's
rationale for granting temporary injunctive relief in light of the fact that
Rutherford was using laetrile neither as a last-reiort treatment for cancer
nor as a supplemental treatment in conjunction with traditional methods.
The Court finds that the plaintiff Rutherford and those similarly
situated are wholly without means or resources to comply with the
provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) and that for the plaintiff Ruther-
ford and those similarly situated to be denied the freedom of choice
for treatment by laetrile to alleviate or cure their cancer, was and
is a deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of
law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
Id. at 1213.
14. 542 F.2d 1137, 1143-44 (10th Cir. 1976). For the definition of new
drug, see text accompanying note 50 infra.
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Rutherford and similar cases 15 present several interesting ques-
tions. The threshold inquiry in the federal court cases is whether
a substance like laetrile falls within the scope of certain sections
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and is therefore subject to
the safety and efficacy requirements of the Act. If the Act is appli-
cable, and the substance is not approved for interstate shipment,
it is necessary to determine whether an individual has a fundamen-
tal constitutional right' 6 to obtain and use drugs of questionable
efficacy for personal health care. If that right were recognized,
it would become necessary for the government to show a compelling
state interest 7 and to use narrowly drawn means to justify
infringement upon the right.'8 A final question is whether dis-
tributors and physicians have standing to assert the health-care
rights possessed by the users of a substance like laetrile.' 9
FoOD, DRUG, AND COsMETIc ACT
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 established
a complex set of provisions which required premarketing review
15. See note 9 supra. See also People v. Privitera, 55 Adv. Cal. App. 3d
Supp. 39, 128 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1976), rev'g No. 11825 (Citrus, Cal., Mun. Ct.,
Feb. 3, 1975). The lower court had held CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY COD §
1707.1 (West 1970), which prohibits the sale and administration of certain
substances for the treatment or cure of cancer, unconstitutional. De-
fendant challenged the statute as being overbroad because it could stop the
distribution of an effective drug. The appeals court cited Weinberger v.
Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 653-54 (1973), for the proposition
that such statutes must necessarily be broad in order to protect the public
against untested drugs. The court also rejected an argument that the stat-
ute, which did not make it unlawful to administer laetrile (the drug in
question) for purposes other than treating cancer, violated equal protection
in impliedly distinguishing between cancer patients and non-cancer pa-
tients. The court rejected a right of privacy argument by saying that Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was simply not applicable.
16. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
17. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
18. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,
508, (1964).
19. This Comment is not intended to encourage the use of drugs of ques-
tionable efficacy nor will it explore the scientific worth of claims made in
behalf of these substances. See M. CULBERT, VITAMIN B17, at 205-07 (1974),
for a list of books, articles, and papers concerning studies on laetrile. This
Comment will not discuss the many administrative due process problems
which arise under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act but instead will focus
on the applicability of certain provisions of the Act and substantive con-
stitutional issues.
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of drugs.20 That review was directed solely toward ensuring drug
safety; efficacy remained a matter largely beyond premarketing
review.2 1 The 1962 amendments to the Act 22 produced significant
changes in the scope of the law and introduced the require-
ment that new drugs must be proven both safe and effective before
they may be introduced into interstate commerce.
23
The Act sets forth a number of exacting requirements for those
distributing and trarisporting drugs in interstate commerce,
2 4
including provisions that deal with adulteration and purity, 5
20. Congress, under the power of the commerce clause, first chose to reg-
ulate drugs on a national scope by passing the Food and Drug Act of 1906,
ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). This Act provided certain standards of purity
for drugs sold in the United States and also required that labeling accu-
rately reflect a drug's contents. More than three decades later, Congress
repealed the 1906 Act and replaced it with the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).
21. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(p) & § 505, 52 Stat. 1041 & 1052,
as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1970), § 355 (Supp. V 1975). Under the
1938 Act, a new drug application (NDA) became effective automatically
after 60 days unless positive steps were taken to refuse approval of the ap-
plication. Id. § 505(c), 52 Stat. 1052, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (1970).
Approval could be refused if, after notice and opportunity for hearing, the
Secretary of Agriculture determined that the application contained inade-
quate data to establish that the drug was safe, failed to establish that the
drug was safe, or established the drug as unsafe. Note that today enforce-
ment of the Act rests with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
Efficacy is a factor to be considered whenever the drug has serious side
effects or is used in the treatment of life-threatening diseases. See S. REP.
No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 15 (1962). Cf. United States v. Ar-
ticles of Drug Labeled "Quick-O-Ver," 274 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D. Md. 1967),
and United States v. Article of Drug Labeled "Decholin," 264 F. Supp. 473,
482-83 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (both courts rejected government argument that
drug was unsafe because it might lull patient into not seeing a doctor for
a mild ailment).
22. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-871, 76 Stat. 781 (amending Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, codi-
fied at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (Supp. V 1975)). See Jurow, The Effect on the
Pharmaceutical Industry of the "Effectiveness" Provisions of the 1962 Drug
Amendments, 19 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 110 (1964); Note, Drug Efficacy
and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 GEo. L.J. 185 (1971); Note, The
Drug Amendments of 1962, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1082 (1963); Note, The Drug
Amendments of 1962: How Much Regulation?, 18 RTTGERS L. REV. 101 (1963).
23. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 505, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (Supp. V 1975).
See S. REP. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 5-6 (1962). Senator
James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said one
of the principal features of the 1962 amendments was to require "that a
new drug be shown to be effective, as well as safe, before it is cleared for
the market and [to] authorize withdrawal of such drug from the market
if new evidence shows it to be ineffective." 108 CONG. REc. 17365 (1962).
24. Section 201 (b) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321
(b) (1970), defines interstate commerce as commerce between any state or
territory and anyplace outside thereof, and commerce within the District
of Columbia or any other territory not organized with a legislative body.
25. Id. § 501, 21 U.S.C. § 351.
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misbranding and labeling,26 and safety and effectivenessyt A per-
son 28 found to have violated any of these provisions is subject to
criminal penalties 29 and injunctive remedies,30 and the goods are
subject to seizure. 31 In order to avoid these penalties, people can
either claim they fall outside the scope of particular provisions or
attempt to comply with the requirements of the Act. Yet, in the
area of safety and effectiveness, compliance may be impossible
because evidence of the safety and effectiveness of a drug must
meet very high standards of proof3 2 and because proper clinical
analysis in deriving such evidence requires considerable time and
expense.
3 3
The key provision for regulating safety and effectiveness is
section 505 of the Act,34 which provides that new drugs35 cannot
be introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate com-
merce unless they are the subject of an approved new drug applica-
tion (NDA). Section 505(b) of the Act3" requires that an NDA
applicant submit, inter alia, full reports of adequate and well-
controlled clinical investigations which have been made to show
whether the drug is safe and effective for its intended use.
Commercial success in the marketplace and acceptance by physi-
cians are not appropriate standards for judging a drug's safety and
26. Id. § 502, 21 U.S.C. § 352.
27. Id. § 505, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (Supp. V-1975).
28. Id. § 201(e), 21 U.S.C. § 321(e) (1970), defines persons as including
any individual, partnership, corporation, or association.
29. Id. § 303, 21 U.S.C. § 333. See generally United States v. Parkinson,
240 F.2d 918, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1956).
30. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 302, 21 U.S.C. § 332 (Supp. IV 1974).
31. Id. § 304, 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1970). See generally CIBA Corp. v. Wein-
berger, 412 U.S. 640, 644 (1973).
32. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (Supp. V 1975),
describes the evidence requirements.
33. The millions of dollars and years of effort spent on cancer research
alone are an indication of the resources required in the more complex areas
of health-care research.
34. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (Supp. V 1975).
35. New drug is a term of art. See text accompanying note 50 infra for
the statutory definition of new drug.
36. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1970). This provision requires that applicants
file with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare: (1) full reports
of investigations which have been made to show whether the drug is safe
for use and whether it is effective in use; (2) a full list of the articles used
as components of the drug; (3) a full statement of the composition of the
drug; (4) a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities and
controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and packing of the drug; (5)
effectiveness.3 7 In this respect, proponents of laetrile or similar
drugs could not obtain NDA approval on the basis of testimony
by physicians who believe in the merits of the drug.38 If there
is lack of "substantial evidence" 9-that is, lack of adequate and
well-controlled clinical investigations on proof of safety or efficacy
-the NDA will be rejected by the government. 40  Proponents of
a drug like laetrile undoubtedly could not meet the stringent stand-
ards of proof of effectiveness required by the Act because they lack
the necessary data from well-controlled clinical investigations.
41
Typically, the substantial evidence requirement is only a the-
oretical hurdle for drugs like laetrile because a formal new
drug application ordinarily will not be submitted for such drugs.
Rather, because the requirements of section 505 apply only to new
drugs, proponents of an unapproved drug will often contend that
the substance in question is not a drug, or even if it is a drug,
that it is not a new drug. The Act defines the word drug as a
substance intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
samples of the drug and of the articles used as components thereof as the
Secretary may require; and (6) specimens of the labeling proposed to be
used for the drug.
37. Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 422 F.2d 944, 951-55 (6th Cir. 1970).
38. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 619
(1973). The Court stated:
Congress surely has great leeway in setting standards for releasing
on the public, drugs which may well be miracles or, on the other
hand, merely easy money-making schemes through use of fraudu-
lent articles labeled in mysterious scientific dress. The standard of"well-controlled investigations" particularized by the Regulations
is a protective measure designed to ferret out those drugs for
which there is no affirmative, reliable evidence of effectiveness.
Id. at 622. Because of these strict standards, physicians who firmly believe
in the attributes of a drug like laetrile could not provide acceptable evi-
dence of the drug's safety and effectiveness without support of well-con-
trolled scientific studies.
39. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(d), 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1970).
The term substantial evidence means
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations,
including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug
involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be
concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it
purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use pre-
scribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed
labeling thereof.
40. Id. § 505 (e), 21 U.S.C. § 355 (e). It probably is safe to assume
that if laetrile proponents could meet the FDA standards, they would sub-
mit an NDA and proceed to market the drug as a proven cancer cure in
order to obtain maximum financial gain.
41. In April 1970, the Food and Drug Administration assigned an Investi-
gative New Drug application to the McNaughton Foundation to test laetrile,
but permission for testing was revoked 10 days later. M. CULBERT, VITAMIN
B17, at 81 (1974).
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ment, or prevention of disease.42 The intended use of a substance
determines whether it is a drug, regardless of its inherent proper-
ties or dictionary definition.43 A substance which is a food may
also be a drug depending on its intended use.44 Product labels,
promotional materials, advertisements, and even oral representa-
tions are relevant sources for determining whether the product is
intended to be used as drug.45 Although labeling may state that
a substance is intended for use as a flavoring or food substitute,
widespread publicity can still be determinative that a product is
intended to be used as a curative drug.46 Courts have concluded
that the concentrated effort to publicize laetrile for use in cancer
treatment demonstrates that laetrile is intended for such use,
despite the limited uses that may be suggested on the labeling.
47
Courts are inclined to give an extremely broad definition of the
term drug48 and repeatedly have rejected contentions that a sub-
42. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(g) (1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1)
(1970).
43. United States v. 3 Cartons, More or Less, "No. 26 Formula GM," 132
F. Supp. 569, 573 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
44. United States v. Article Consisting of 36 Boxes, More or Less, Labeled
"Line Away, Temporary Wrinkle Smoother, Coty," 284 F. Supp. 107, 111
(D. Del. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1969). Honey under particular
labeling circumstances has been held to be a drug within the meaning o2
the Act. United States v. 250 Jars, Etc., of U.S. Fancy Pure Honey, 218
F. Supp. 208 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1963).
45. United States v. Articles of Drug, Foods Plus, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 465,
468 (D.N.J. 1965), remanded on other grounds, 362 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1966)
(oral representations made by a radio broadcaster); United States v. Nutri-
tion Serv., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 375, 380 (W.D. Pa. 1964), afl'd, 347 F.2d 233
(3d Cir. 1965); United States v. 3 Cartons, More or Less, "No. 26 Formula
GM," 132 F. Supp. 569, 574 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
46. United States v. Nutrition Serv., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 375, 380-81 (W.D.
Pa. 1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1965). In this case, defendants under
the names of two medical clinics began promoting Mucorhicin as safe and
effective in the treatment and cure of many ailments and diseases, including
cancer, by mailing literature about the results of their studies. Subse-
quently, the defendants stopped making these claims, formed defendant cor-
poration, and began marketing Mucorhicin as a dietary food product. The
court found that the intended use of Mucorhicin was for treating disease
because of the prior publicity and found defendants guilty of violating sev-
eral provisions of the Act. Id. at 380-87.
47. Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 540
F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Spectro Foods Corp., Civ. No. 76-
101 (D.N.J., Jan. 28, 1976). See United States v. General Research Labora-
tories, 397 F. Supp. 197, 200 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (no uses suggested).
48. United States v. Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 793,
reh'g denied, 395 U.S. 954 (1969).
stance like laetrile, widely publicized as an alleged cancer cure, is
a food or vitamin.
4
If the substance in question is determined to be a drug, it becomes
necessary to determine whether it is a new drug within the meaning
of the Act. The term new drug is defined under the Act as
any drug . . . the composition of which is such that such drug is
not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of
drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof .... 50
Proponents of a drug who desire to prove it is not a new drug
must show that it is generally recognized by scientific experts as
safe and effective in order to avoid securing an NDA. Thus, sup-
porting affidavits from users of the substance, or even from physi-
cians, will not be sufficient to remove the substance from the new
drug classification if it is not generally recognized by qualified
experts as safe and effective. 51 Utilizing this rationale, several
courts have found that laetrile is a new drug and within the scope
of requirements of section 505 of the Act.
5 2
49. See cases cited note 47 supra.
50. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(p) (1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1)
(1970). This subsection, and in particular the term generally recognized,
have been the target of considerable litigation. One indication that a drug
is not generally recognized among qualified experts as safe and effective
for its intended use is the absence of any published medical or scientific
literature concerning the safety or effectiveness of the drug. This lack of
documented sources of information curtails the widespread knowledge of
the drug's safety and effectiveness. It should be noted that under this pro-
vision the actual safety and effectiveness of the drug are not in issue; rather,
the issue is one of the general recognition of the drug. United States v.
Article of Drug. . . "Mykocert," 345 F. Supp. 571, 574 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Some
courts have taken the position that the mere existence of conflict among
qualified experts in supporting affidavits establishes a lack of general rec-
ognition as a matter of law. Merritt Corp. v. Folsom, 165 F. Supp. 418,
421 (D.D.C. 1958). Other courts have said that when a genuine difference
of opinion exists on the question of whether the safety and effectiveness
of a drug is generally recognized, a drug will not be deemed to be generally
recognized as safe and effective and thus will fall within the new drug def-
inition. United States v. Article of Drug. . . Labeled. . .. (Box) "Furestrol
Vaginal Suppositories," 415 F.2d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1969). Accord, United
States v. 354 Bulk Cartons ... Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp.
847, 853 (D.N.J. 1959). But see United States v. 1,048,000 Capsules, More
or Less, 347 F. Supp. 768, 770 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1158 (5th
Cir. 1974), in which the court said extensive recognition rather than uni-
versal recognition will suffice. See also Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceu-
ticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 652 (1973).
51. United States v. Article of Drug . "Mykocert," 345 F. Supp. 571,
575 (N.D. Ill. 1972); United States v. 7 Cartons. . . "Ferro-Lac Swine For-
mula Concentrate," 293 F. Supp. 660, 664 (S.D. Ill. 1968), modified, 424 F.2d
1364 (7th Cir. 1970).
52. Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 36 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 540
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A grandfather clause in the Act exempts older drugs from the
safety and effectiveness requirements if the drugs were in use at
the time the Act was enacted in 1938 and if the labeling of such
drugs contained the same representations as are now being made
concerning the conditions of use.53 Although the grandfather
clause has been the subject of extensive litigation in recent
years, 4 proponents of laetrile-type drugs have little hope of escap-
ing the safety and effectiveness requirements by virtue of this pro-
vision. It is apparent that proponents of most unapproved drugs
cannot claim that their drug is intended for use under the same
conditions as prescribed or recommended in the original labeling
because there generally was no prior labeling of those drugs. Fur-
thermore, many of the "miracle drugs" of unproven safety and
efficacy simply were not in use prior to 1938. Thus, they do not
fall within the grandfather exception.
In essence, a health-care drug of unproven safety or efficacy
ordinarily cannot be transported in interstate commerce without
violating the Act, even if the substance is transported for personal
use.5 5 As a result, people are deprived of an opportunity to obtain
F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Spectro Foods Corp., Civ. No. 76-
101 (D.N.J., Jan. 28, 1976); United States v. General Research Laboratories,
397 F. Supp. 197, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1975). See Rutherford v. United States,
399 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (W.D. Okla. 1975), remanded, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th
Cir. 1976).
53. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 102(a) (1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1)
(1970). Because the 1962 amendments added the requirement of effective-
ness, if on October 9, 1962, a drug like laetrile was marketed for exactly the
same uses for which it is presently being sold and was generally recognized
by qualified experts as safe for those uses, it is exempt from the general
recognition requirements of safety and effectiveness. Rutherford v. United
States, 542 F.2d 1137, 1141 (10th Cir. 1976).
54. E.g., USV Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655, 663-64
(1973); Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, 412 U.S. 645, 652 (1973);
Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 628 (1973).
55. A person transporting drugs in interstate commerce is concerned
about much more than simply the safety and efficacy requirements. Of
major importance also are the adulteration and misbranding standards.
The misbranding provisions of section 502 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1970),
are somewhat interrelated with the efficacy and safety standards. A drug
may be misbranded if its labeling contains too much information (un-
founded claims) or too little information (inadequate directions for use and
inadequate warnings of potential dangers). Furthermore, the Federal
Trade Commission Act, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 52 (Supp. V 1975), makes it un-
lawful for any person to disseminate any false advertisements in the mails
or in commerce for the purpose of inducing, directly or indirectly, the pur-
chase of drugs. It should also be noted that section 505(i) of the Food,
and use these unapproved substances, except through illicit chan-
nels.5 6 If all of the technical arguments to avoid the safety and
efficacy requirements fail, a person wishing to transport unap-
proved drugs in interstate commerce has two legal options: First,
he can attempt to meet the difficult, expensive, and time-consuming
standards of proof for safety and efficacy which Congress has found
necessary for protection of public health; or, second, he can try
attacking the Act on constitutional grounds. Increasing numbers
of laetrile proponents are resorting to constitutional arguments.
THE RIGHT TO OBTAIN HEALTH-CARE DRUGS
A constitutional right to obtain and use health-care drugs of ques-
tionable efficacy might be derived from either a substantive due
process concept of liberty 57 or from a right of privacy. 8 Because of
the uncertain scope of liberty and privacy, use of the term privacy is
primarily for convenience and is not intended to exclude the con-
cept of liberty.59 Privacy in this context does not deal with the
right of selective disclosure; rather, it focuses on broader aspects
of autonomy and is concerned with a more generalized ability of
individuals to determine for themselves whether to perform certain
acts or to undergo certain experiences.60
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1970), provides that drugs for
research may be exempted from proof of efficacy and safety under certain
conditions.
56. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 510, 21 U.S.C. § 360 (1970), appears
to be a further hindrance to a person's ability to obtain and use unapproved
drugs for health-care purposes. That provision requires that every person
who owns or operates any establishment engaged in the manufacture, prep-
aration, propagation, compounding, or processing of drugs must register
with the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
The only exceptions to this requirement are practitioners compounding
drugs solely for use in course of professional practice, people manufacturing
drugs solely for research purposes, and people engaged in other limited ac-
tivities.
57. Whenever a federal act is under attack, the fifth amendment due
process clause is asserted. E.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Rad-
ford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935). The same arguments apply to state statutes
under the fourteenth amendment due process clause. E.g., Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165, 168-72 (1952). Procedural due process could become a
factor depending on how the Food and Drug Administration handled a par-
ticular new drug application, but the success of such a challenge would
depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. For instance, an
applicant might be able to show unjust discrimination against an NDA for
laetrile because of its controversial background.
58. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
59. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (privacy concept is founded
in fourteenth amendment). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211-20
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
60. See cases cited note 59 supra. The "right of selective disclosure" has
been defined as the ability of "individuals, groups, or institutions to deter-
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If some type of fundamental privacy right is recognized within
the context of health-care treatment, the government could limit
such right only by a compelling state interest and by a statute nar-
rowly drawn to express only the legitimate interests at stake.61
Failure to establish that a fundamental right is at issue would mean
that the statute could be upheld on a mere rational relation basis-
that is, by showing that the statutory scheme is rationally related
to a permissible state objective.
62
At first impression, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act seems to
restrict only commercial rights. However, it has been noted that
the Act does not distinguish between commercial and personal
traffic of health-care drugs.63 Because an individual violates the
Act by transporting unapproved health-care drugs in interstate
commerce for his own personal use, the Act intrudes on more than
mere commercial or property rights of drug distributors. If only
commercial rights were at stake, the Act would undoubtedly be up-
held by a showing that its statutory scheme is rationally related
to the protection of public health and well-being. 64 However, with
personal rights at stake, a stricter standard of scrutiny may be
appropriate.6 5
The rights of which a person may not be deprived without due
process of law include the "right to life."66 Although there has
been no acceptable scientific proof that a drug like laetrile can
arrest cancer, many users of laetrile attest to the curative worth of
mine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others." A. WESTIN, PRIVAcY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
See also Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle? 26 STAN.
L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1974).
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 524 (1960). See notes 17 & 18 supra.
62. E.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957);
Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921); United States v. Kiffer, 477
F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831 (1973).
63. See, e.g., Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (Supp.
V 1975).
64. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 485-88 (1955);
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 (1938). See
also J. BARRON & C. DIENrEs, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINcIPLES AND POLICY
548 (1975). But cf. F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTIcE HoLIFs AND THE SUPREME
CouRT 74 (2d ed. 1961) (It is contended that a sharp division between prop-
erty rights and personal rights cannot realistically be made.).
65. At least one decision has indicated that a stricter standard of scrutiny
is appropriate even when personal rights tend to merge with quasi-commer-
cial interests. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1972).
66. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V & XIV.
the drug.67 Users of the substance claim that the denial of an
opportunity to obtain and use laetrile results in denial of an oppor-
tunity to protect their lives. Such claims require some proof of
efficacy and raise questions concerning a court's jurisdiction to
determine the effectiveness of a drug.68
It is important, however, to note that a right of privacy in a
health-care context could have a direct bearing on a person's ability
to live. Because freedom of action is at stake, it is more feasible
to view this freedom of choice as falling within the scope of privacy
rather than treating it as an independent right to life. Otherwise,
any type of situation which could affect a person's ability to live-
be it air pollution standards or auto safety requirements-could be
said to encompass a right to life. Nonetheless, the significance of
the privacy right is enhanced because it could have life-determining
consequences. The basis for extending a right of privacy into per-
sonal health care is best demonstrated by analyzing related areas
of law in which the privacy issue has been raised.
ANALOGOUS AREAS or PRiVAcY
Support can be found for a right of privacy in a health-care
context by analyzing privacy issues as related to (1) marijuana
possession, (2) fluoridation of public water supplies, (3) compulsory
vaccinations, and (4) contraception and abortion.
Marijuana
Marijuana in its ordinary usage is not considered a health-
care substance. 69 However, like laetrile it is proscribed despite
substantial public demand and despite its questionable physical
effects.70 Although a number of different constitutional chal-
lenges, ranging from equal protection to cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, have been made to laws proscribing possession of mari-
juana, only those cases involving a theme of privacy or individual
liberty are relevant to this Comment.7 1
67. See Rutherford v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (W.D. Okla.
1975), remanding 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976).
68. See notes 129-31 infra and accompanying text.
69. But see NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1976, at 53; San Diego Union, Oct. 6, 1976,
§ C, at 1, col. 1 (Marijuana is being tested for effectiveness in the treatment
of glaucoma.).
70. The differences between statutes affecting marijuana and those af-
fecting laetrile must be pointed out. Whereas marijuana is directly pro-
scribed, laetrile is affected only because it is considered a health-care drug.
A substance like laetrile may be legalized by fulfilling the requirements
of an NDA.
71. E.g., United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 831 (1973); United States v. Maiden, 355 F. Supp. 743 (D. Conn. 1973);
State v. Kantner, 53 Hawaii 327, 336-37, 493 P.2d 306, 312 (Abe, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167,
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A large majority of courts has flatly rejected constitutional
attacks on marijuana statutes.72 Two federal courts, however,
were willing to entertain, though not embrace, the concept of a
right of privacy protecting private possession of marijuana, indicat-
ing that they might recognize a right to possess marijuana for per-
sonal use were that the issue.73 These courts flatly rejected any
extension of such a right to include distribution.74 One court, not-
ing that the defendants were prosecuted for possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute, said it need not decide the necessity of
invoking strict scrutiny that adheres to a "fundamental right of
the individual to control of his own body and to indulge in private
what may be condemned in public or deemed immoral or unaccept-
able to society at large.
'75
In a similar case, People v. Sinclair," the Michigan Supreme
Court reversed on several grounds a defendant's conviction for
illegal possession of marijuana. One justice thought that a statute
proscribing mere possession represented "an impermissible intru-
182, 194 N.W.2d 827, 834 (1972) (Kavanagh, J., dissenting in part); People
v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 133, 194 N.W.2d 878, 896 (1972) (Kavanagh, J.,
concurring). A number of commentators have explored the idea of freedom
in the use of marijuana. E.g., Bonnie & Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit
and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American
Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV. 971 (1970); Soler, Of Cannabis and
the Courts: A Critical Examination of Constitutional Challenges to Statu-
tory Marijuana Prohibitions, 6 CONN. L. REv. 601 (1974); Weiss & Wizner,
Pot, Prayer, Politics and Privacy: The Right To Cut Your Own Throat In
Your Own Way, 54 IowA L. REv. 709 (1969); Note, The California Mari-
juana Possession Statute: An Infringement On The Right of Privacy or
Other Peripheral Constitutional Rights? 19 HAsvNGs L.J. 758 (1968).
72. E.g., People v. Oatis, 264 Cal App. 2d 324, 70 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1108 (1969); People v. Aguiar, 257 Cal App. 2d 597,
65 Cal. Rptr. 171, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 970 (1968); Commonwealth v. Leis,
355 Mass. 189, 243 N.E.2d 898 (1969).
73. United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 831 (1973); United States v. Maiden, 355 F. Supp. 743, 746-47 (D. Conn.
1973).
74. Id.
75. United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 831 (1973).
76. 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972). Two judges based the reversal
on their opinion that the statutory categorization of marijuana along with
"hard drug" narcotics for purposes of imposition of penalties denied equal
protection. One judge based reversal on the opinion that the statute denied
the right to liberty. Two judges believed that the marijuana cigarettes
should have been excluded as evidence obtained as a result of illegal en-
trapment, and two judges supported reversal on the basis that a minimum
sentence of 9 years constituted cruel and inhuman punishment.
sion of the fundamental right to liberty, '77 although he indicated
that a proper public interest may exist in controlling the traffic
in marijuana. Comparable arguments were made in separate
opinions in another marjuana case.7 8  Decisions following the
rationale voiced in Sinclair indicate that the government interest
in prohibiting possession of marijuana for personal use must yield
to the individual's privacy interest.79  However, when courts con-
clude that marijuana may be considered harmful, the privacy inter-
est must yield to the government interest in protecting health.80
When weighing the potential for harm against the privacy interest,
consideration of the type of privacy at stake may be appropriate.
Privacy in the context of health care would seem to deserve more
weight than privacy in the context of marijuana use."'
These cases indicate that a handful of authorities are willing to
accept the idea that an individual has a right to possess for personal
use a substance capable of producing questionable physical effects.
One judge also stated that the right to use something has little
meaning unless one also has the right to acquire it.82  Although
the right to possess something logically would seem to entail a right
to obtain it, the Supreme Court has said that the right to view
obscene materials in one's own home does not include the right to
77. Id. at 133, 194 N.W.2d at 896 (Kavanagh, J., concurring).
78. State v. Kantner, 53 Hawaii 327, 493 P.2d 306, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
948 (1972). One justice emphasized the individual's "fundamental right of
liberty." Id. at 336-37, 493 P.2d at 312 (Abe, J., concurring). Another jus-
tice said "[t] he very concept of limited government evinces a desire to free
persons from the unbounded control of the State, in order that they most
productively pursue their own life goals." Id. at 339, 493 P.2d at 313 (Lev-
inson, J., dissenting).
79. E.g., People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 133, 194 N.W.2d 878, 896 (1972)
(Kavanagh, J., concurring).
80. Although authorities upholding a right of privacy to allow possession
and use of marijuana conclude that the harmful effects of marijuana are
negligible and do not justify infringement upon a person's privacy, courts
usually reach an opposite conclusion. E.g., People v. Aguiar, 257 Cal. App.
2d 597, 606, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171, 176, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 970 (1968) (It is
rational to conclude that marijuana use is dangerous and that there is no
protected right for its use.); Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 194-95,
243 N.E.2d 898, 902-04 (1969) (Marijuana use could lead to hard drug use,
and its use does not fall within protection of any penumbra of constitutional
amendments.). Because of the uncertain safety, the above cases apparently
reason that the government has a strong interest in restricting use of mari-
juana.
81. Privacy for protecting marijuana use has been called the right of lib-
erty to make a fool of oneself. State v. Kantner, 53 Hawaii 327, 336-37,
493 P.2d 306, 312 (Abe, J., concurring), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
Compare the type of general health-interest privacy deemed protected in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
82. People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 182, 194 N.W.2d 827, 834 (1972)
(Kavanagh, J., dissenting in part).
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obtain those materials.88 However, in the context of "drugs"
within the scope of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Eisenstadt
v. Baird8 4 indicates that a right of privacy protecting use also pro-
tects the right to obtain. Like the statute under attack in
Eisenstadt, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act similarly restricts an
individual's right to obtain unapproved drugs. In this respect, the
federal act proscribing interstate transportation and the state acts
proscribing administration intrude upon the individual's privacy to
use such substances, even though use or mere possession is not
directly prohibited.8 5
Fluoridation
Unlike the marijuana cases, fluoridation of public water sup-
plies directly concerns the issue of health care. Fluoridated water
is not forced upon anyone, but obviously people dependent upon
the public water supply must ingest the fluoride. Although fluori-
dation might be considered a form of compulsory medical treat-
ment, courts have repeatedly upheld the government's right to
fluoridate public water supplies.8 6 In the most recent fluori-
83. See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (no right to transport
obscenity in interstate commerce for personal use); United States v. 12,200-
ft. Reels of 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (no right to import obscenity
for personal use); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (no right
to distribute obscenity to consenting adult purchaser). Rather than setting
precedent for restricting other personal rights, these cases, as the dissenting
opinions suggest, probably stand for a de facto overruling of Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), which recognized a person's right to possess
obscene material for private use. See, e.g., United States v. Orito, 413 U.S.
139, 145-48 (Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
84. 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972). The Supreme Court strongly emphasized
a right of privacy for single people seeking the use of contraceptives and
concluded that enforcement of the statute restricting distribution to married
couples materially impaired the ability of single people to obtain contracep-
tives. The substance in Eisenstadt was vaginal foam, which, like laetrile,
apparently falls within the definition of drug as used in the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act. Despite the same classification, there are obvious differ-
ences between the two substances. For further discussion, see notes 107,
108, & 111 infra and accompanying text.
85. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (Supp. V
1975). Plaintiffs like Rutherford claim that the statutory provisions prohib-
iting interstate transportation of unapproved drugs cut off their ability to
obtain, and consequently, to use such substances. Cf. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1707.1 (West 1970), which prohibits the sale, offering for sale,
holding for sale, delivering, giving away, prescribing, or administering of
any drug or substance to be used in the treatment or cure of cancer.
86. See list of authorities cited in Minnesota State Bd. of Health v. City
of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed for lack
of a federal question, 97 S. Ct. 35 (1976).
dation decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that while
forced fluoridation does intrude upon an individual's decision to
ingest fluoride, the impact of this intrusion on an individual's life
is negligible.87 The court added that the impact of putting micro-
scopic amounts of fluoride into a person's body is especially slight
when compared to the right of privacy deemed protected by the
contraception and abortion decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.
88
The rationale used in upholding fluoridation of public water
supplies has not been universally accepted. The dissent in one case
maintained that the mandatory fluoridation established by a city
deprived a person of liberty without due process of law.0 The
dissent in effect concluded that the city ordinance deprived an
individual of the freedom to choose his own mode of health-care
treatment. 0
It is apparent that the fluoridation cases uphold the government's
right to fluoridate public water mainly because of the nature of
the infringement. Many of the courts have emphasized that
fluoridation is a harmless, trivial intrusion.0 1 As a consequence,
courts reason that the protection of public health afforded by
fluoridation far outweighs any infringement of individual lib-
erty.9 2 Further, because a city cannot feasibly fluoridate part of
its water supply, the cities are applying the least restrictive alter-
native. Although prohibiting interstate movement of an unap-
proved drug like laetrile is also justified on grounds of public
health, a serious question exists of whether the current blanket pro-
hibition is the most narrowly defined means of serving the state
interest.93
Vaccination
Both the fluoridation and compulsory vaccination cases involve
the government's right to take affirmative action to intrude upon
privacy for purposes of health care. Obviously vaccinations repre-
sent the more significant intrusion upon personal autonomy.
87. Minnesota State Bd. of Health v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624,
632 (Minn. Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed for lack of a federal question, 97
S. Ct. 35 (1976).
88. Id.
89. Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, 626-33, 277 P.2d 352, 357-62
(1954) (Hill, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. E.g., Minnesota State Bd. of Health v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d
624, 632 (Minn. Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed for lack of a federal question,
97 S. Ct. 35 (1976).
92. Id.
93. This question is discussed in notes 155-59 infra and accompanying
text.
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The leading case on the vaccination issue, Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts,94 upheld compulsory vaccination in the face of a threatened
smallpox epidemic. In Jacobson the Court stated that forced
vaccination under the circumstances was not an unconstitutional
infringement of any rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment.95 The Court, rather than downplaying the personal interest
at stake, emphasized the imminence of the deadly disease. 96 In
explaining the principle underlying its decision, the Court paral-
leled the state's intrusion upon personal liberty with military con-
scription to protect national security and emphasized the compel-
ling state interest to justify the invasion of personal rights.9 7 Al-
though the Court stated it did not perceive that the statute invaded
any right secured by the Constitution,9" its entire analysis in show-
ing the necessity of such a compulsory vaccination indicates an
implied recognition of some personal right. Jacobson arguably
embodies the principle that the personal right to care for one's
health is a fundamental right of privacy which may be abridged
only when justified by a compelling state interest.9 9 In Jacobson
the compelling state interest was to protect the individual against
the threat of disease and the public at large against the spread of
disease. However, the Court implied that even this strong state in-
94. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
95. Id. at 37-38.
96. Id. at 26. Defendant termed the personal right at stake "the inherent
right of every freeman to care for his own body and health in such way
as he deems best." Id.
97. Id. at 29-30. The Court stated:
There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert
the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority
of any human government, especially of any free government exist-
ing under a written constitution, to interfere with the exercise of
that will. But it is equally true that in every well-ordered society
charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members, the
rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under
the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general
public may demand .... It is not, therefore, true that the power
of the public to guard itself against imminent danger depends in
every case involving the control of one's body upon his willing-
ness to submit to reasonable regulations established by the consti-
tuted authorities, under the sanction of the state, for the purpose
of protecting the public effectively against such danger.
98. Id. at 38.
99. A similar analysis and conclusion based on Jacobson is found in Brief
for Appellants at 94-95, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme
Court left appellant's contentions unanswered and merely cited Jacobson
for authority that there is not an unlimited right to do with one's body as
one pleases. 410 U.S. at 154.
terest is insufficient to overcome the personal right if an indi-
vidual's life were threatened by compulsory vaccination. 00
In the fluoridation and vaccination cases, the courts seem to be
upholding the interests of the state in keeping its citizens healthy-
a type of affirmative action health care whereby the state may force
medicinal substances upon a person under certain conditions. In
the laetrile and contraception-abortion areas, the state has engaged
in a type of negative action health care by hindering access to cer-
tain health-care aids. Arguably the government has a greater bur-
den in justifying denial of health-care remedies because a person
might be denied an actual cure.1'0
Contraception and Abortion
In essence, the cases of Griswold v. Connecticut,02 Eisenstadt v.
Baird,103 and Roe v. Wade 0 4 address the issue of a person's constitu-
tional right to take health-care action. In all three cases, the indi-
vidual right was deemed superior to the state interest.
The Supreme Court in Griswold held that the state could not
ban the use of contraceptives without abridging a couple's right
to privacy which underlies the marriage relationship.105 Gris-
100. 197 U.S. at 39. The Court stated:
[W]e are not inclined to hold that the statute established the
absolute rule that an adult must be vaccinated if it be apparent or
can be shown with reasonable certainty that he is not at the time a
fit subject of vaccination or that vaccination, by reason of his then
condition, would seriously impair his health or probably cause his
death.
The court's analysis indicates that an individual's interest in personal au-
tonomy must be weighed against the government's interest in public health.
When the individual's interest has life-determining consequences, his right
of privacy will be superior to the general government interest in protecting
health. A less restrictive means is readily available in vaccination situa-
tions-the government need only refrain from giving vaccinations to indi-
viduals whose lives are endangered by such action.
101. Even if an individual is forced to take a health-care substance such
as a vaccine or fluoride, he probably will not be harmed. However, denial
of a potentially effective drug could have severe repercussions.
102. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
103. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
104. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
105. 381 U.S. at 485-86. The Supreme Court's recognition of the right
of privacy began with its decision in Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), which was handed down one year after the ap-
pearance of Warren and Brandeis' article, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAnv.
L. REV. 193-220 (1890). Subsequently, the right of privacy has been found
in the first amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); in the
fourth and fifth amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968), and Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); in the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); in the ninth
amendment, id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring); and in the concept of
liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
153 (1973), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See generally
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wold is significant in that the Supreme Court recognized a right
of privacy within the general spirit of health care. However, the
substances at issue in Griswold were intended to be used for con-
traception rather than for prevention of disease. Furthermore, the
statute in question prohibited the actual use of contraceptives, not
possession or distribution. As previously stated, the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act does not prohibit use, or mere possession, of
unapproved drugs. It prohibits only interstate transportation while
the state statutes prohibit administration of such drugs.
10 6
Eisenstadt upheld the right of a person to distribute contracep-
tives on grounds that a statute prohibiting distribution to single
people violated equal protection by distinguishing between married
and single people. 10 7 The Court's opinion has a strong right to
privacy flavor.'0 8 The case is especially significant because the
right to privacy argument was recognized beyond mere use of a
drug'00 and was extended to the user's right to obtain such an
item.110 However, the privacy rights in Eisenstadt, like those in
Griswold, seem to be directly related to the idea of contraception
and sexual relations."' Nevertheless, these two decisions took
the first steps in the direction of recognizing a right of privacy
encompassing general health-care activities.
Roe v. Wade expanded the right of privacy beyond contraception.
The Supreme Court held that the right of privacy encompasses a
M. MAYER, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY 39-53 (1972); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy,
74 COLUm. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Wheeler & Kovar, Roe v. Wade: The Right
of Privacy Revisited, 21 U. KAN. L. Rzv. 527 (1973); Note, On Privacy: Con-
stitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670 (1973).
106. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
107. 405 U.S. at 454-55.
108. Id. at 453. The Court stated:
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the indi-
vidual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
109. The substance involved in the case was actually vaginal foam, which
apparently falls within the definition of a drug under section 201 (g) (1) of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1) (1970).
110. 405 U.S. at 453-54. Note, however, that the user of the drug was
not a party to the case; rather, the distributor was allowed to assert the
rights of the user-distributee. See text accompanying notes 172-73 infra.
111. The health-care aspect of the contraceptive (protecting a woman's
health by preventing pregnancy) probably plays only a minor role in sup-
porting the Court's view that contraceptives should be made accessible to
the public. The primary considerations seem to be sexual relations and
family planning, including the general concern over population growth.
See note 84 supra.
woman's decision to have an abortion, whether such a right is found
in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty or the
ninth amendment's reservation of rights to the people.112 The
Court stated that only personal rights that can be deemed "funda-
mental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are included
in this guarantee of personal privacy. 113 Because the Court found
that the right to an abortion fell within this definition, a right of
personal choice for general health-care activities could also be con-
sidered in the same category of "fundamental rights." As Jus-
tice Douglas said in a companion case, the right of privacy includes
"the right to care for one's health and person and to seek out a
physician of one's own choice .... 114
The existence of a special right of privacy encompassing health-
care activities is supported by the fact that numerous decisions have
emphasized the importance of health-care treatment. In one deci-
sion, the Supreme Court reaffirmed society's expectation that
patients receive "such treatment as is necessary to preserve their
health."'11  Similarly, a right of access to health care has been
held necessary," 6 and custodial patients have been accorded a
constitutional right to receive a sufficient health-care treatment. 17
It has also been suggested for purposes of review that there is "a
right to medical treatment to the extent that the state may not
make unavailable a medically safe and effective drug which is
necessary to the maintenance of an individual's health and well-
being." 8  The existence of a physician-patient privilege serves as
further evidence of the legal recognition afforded privacy in health-
112. 410 U.S. at 153. The Supreme Court believed that a right of privacy
was derived from the fourteenth amendment, rather than from the ninth
amendment. In essence, the Court held that because a law regulating or
prohibiting the performance of abortions limits a woman's fundamental
constitutional right to privacy, such a law can be justified only by the show-
ing of a compelling state interest. During the first trimester of pregnancy, a
physician's decision, in consultation with his patient, that the pregnancy
should be terminated by an abortion, may be effectuated without any inter-
ference by the state, for there is no compelling state interest in interfering
with such a decision. In the middle trimester the state, in promoting its
interest in the health of the mother, may regulate the abortion procedure
in ways reasonably related to maternal health. During the final trimester
of pregnancy, the state, in promoting its interest in protecting fetal life after
viability, may proscribe abortions unless necessary to preserve the mother's
life or health.
113. Id. at 152. The Court quoted Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937).
114. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 219 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
115. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71 (1971).
116. McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112, 114 (N.D. Cal. 1955). Ac-
cord, Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1970).
117. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
118. Blinder v. Division of Narcotic Enforcement, 25 Cal. App. 3d 174,
182, 101 Cal. Rptr. 635, 640 (1972).
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care treatment. 119
Although the Court did not define the dimensions of the privacy
right, Roe v. Wade laid the groundwork for eventual recognition
of a right to privacy in the area of health care. Furthermore, the
marijuana cases are adequate indication of a willingness by some
authorities to recognize that the right of privacy includes freedom
to possess and obtain certain types of drugs for personal use. The
fact that drugs are to be used for personal health-care treatment,
rather than for mere hedonistic pursuits, strengthens the argument
that individual privacy should be protected in a person's attempt
to use these substances. Eisenstadt indicates that the scope of
privacy should encompass the right to obtain, as well as to use,
health-care drugs.12
0
The fluoridation and vaccination cases do not directly recognize
a right of privacy in a health-care context, but the type of analysis
undertaken by the courts certainly implies that such a fundamental
right exists. These cases suggest that the right of privacy in the
area of health -care is to be given strong consideration and that
it may be infringed only by showing a compelling state interest.
In relation to health-care drugs, the analyses of the courts indicate
that a person should have a right to obtain and use health-care
drugs of questionable efficacy unless the government can show a
compelling interest to restrict such a right. In this respect, the criti-
cal factor is the determination of the compelling state interests and
the necessary means of applying those interests.
STATE INTERESTS IN DRUG REGULATION
The general state interest in enacting the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and similar state laws is protection of public health.
The Supreme Court has said the purposes of the federal Act touch
phases in the lives and health of people which, in circumstances of
modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection.'21 Clearly
the Act's objective is to prevent the distribution and sale of adulter-
119. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 990-1007 (West Supp. 1976) (laws deal-
with the physician-patient privilege). See generally Cole v. Wolfskill, 49
Cal. App. 52, 192 P. 549 (1920).
120. 405 U.S. at 453-54. In addition, Justice White said "to sanction a
medical restriction upon distribution of a contraceptive not proved hazard-
ous to health would impair the exercise of the constitutional right [of
privacy]." Id. at 464 (White, J., concurring).
121. 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596-600 (1951). See
United States v. Diapulse Corp. of America, 457 F.2d 25, 27-28 (2d Cir.
1972).
ated, unsafe, or ineffective health-care drugs.122 However, the scope
of the Act goes beyond protection of the public from profit-hungry
manufacturers and distributors; it also serves to protect a person
against himself by prohibiting interstate transportation of unap-
proved drugs even for personal use.
Although there has been considerable controversy over the
government's power to regulate private conduct,123 it seems well
established in American law that a person's self-destructive conduct
-be it moral or physical-may be controlled. 24  The Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade specifically stated that there is not an
unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases. Other cases
have upheld the government's authority to proscribe possession of
dangerous and habit-forming drugs.125 More recently, a number
of cases have upheld statutes requiring motorcyclists to wear safety
helmets-an indication that the government has an interest in
infringing upon personal choice and personal liberty in order to
protect an individual against a mere possibility of self-harm. 20
Obviously the government has a strong interest in regulating per-
sonal use of a physically dangerous drug because of the harmful ef-
fects upon the user. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld a state law
122. The federal government's authority to regulate health-care drugs is
based on the commerce clause. All agree that Congress in the exercise of
its authority over interstate commerce may regulate interstate traffic of
food and drugs. E.g., United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432 (1947); Seven
Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510 (1916). The state government's au-
thority is based on its police power, which gives a state "broad power
to establish and enforce standards of conduct . . . relative to the health of
everyone." Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954).
'123. E.g., J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1956 ed.). Mill states at 13:
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral,
is not a sufficient warrant .... Over himself, over his body and
mind, the individual is sovereign.
See, e.g., Lister, The Right To Control The Use of One's Body, in THE RIGHTS
OF AMERICANS 349 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971).
124. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n.15 (1973), in
which the Court observed that statute books are replete with constitution-
ally unchallenged laws against suicide and self-mutilation, implying that
the state has a legitimate interest in regulating any activity which may be
harmful to the individual.
125. E.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (narcotics); Whip-
ple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41 (1921) (habit-forming drugs); Crane v. Camp-
bell, 245 U.S. 304 (1917) (intoxicating liquor); Blinder v. Division of Nar-
cotics Enforcement, 25 Cal. App. 3d 174, 101 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1972) (metha-
done).
126. See People v. Poucher, 67 Mich. App. 133, 135-36, 240 N.W.2d 298,
299 (1976), for cases cited upholding the authority of the state to require
the wearing of safety helmets and stating that such a requirement is not
an unconstitutional invasion of a person's right to be let alone. Courts in
29 states have held helmet legislation valid. Id. The only contrary holding
to date is People v. Fries, 42 Ill. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969).
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forbidding the sale, administration, and possession of morphine de-
spite its medical use. 27 Two California cases held that opium, even
though it has beneficial use as a medicinal drug, could be regulated
in its sale and disposition, even to the extent of its absolute prohi-
bition. 128  In both situations, the courts implied that the state's
interest in protecting an individual against the use of dangerous
drugs outweighed the medicinal benefit an individual could obtain
from the use of such substances.
Safety is a compelling government interest in the regulation of
health drugs, and efficacy seems to be directly related to the con-
cept of safety. Even though evidence of toxicity is lacking, an
ineffective drug promoted as a cure for certain diseases may induce
patients who are in a medically aidable condition to delay medical
treatment by competent physicians to the extent they become less
curable.129 As a consequence, interstate shipment of an ineffec-
tive drug could cause irreparable injury.130 The belief that
ineffective drugs are dangerous to public health is based upon two
assumptions: First, use of such substances will induce the person
to refrain from traditional treatment; and second, traditional treat-
ment might effect a cure of the patient. Proponents of laetrile con-
test these assumptions, stating that at a minimum a drug of ques-
tionable efficacy like laetrile should be available as supplemental
treatment.131 When used as a supplemental means of treatment
along with more traditional methods, a safe drug will cause no addi-
tional harm to the user even if ineffective. In sum, if a drug is
127. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921).
128. In re Yun Quong, 159 Cal. 508, 114 P. 835 (1911); In re Hallawell,
8 Cal. App. 563, 97 P. 320 (1908).
129. United States v. Nutrition Serv., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 375, 388 (W.D.
Pa. 1964), affd, 347 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1965). See also 17 CAL. AD. CODE
§ 10400.1 (1963), which specifically bans the sale, administration, and pre-
scription, inter alia, of laetrile to any patient who has or believes he has
cancer. The California Department of Public Health has concluded:
[T] he use of one or more of these agents in early cancer to the ex-
clusion of conventional treatment might well be dangerous since
treatment with acceptable, modern, curative methods . . . would
thereby be delayed potentially until such time as metastases had
occurred and the cancer therefore might no longer be curable.
Id.
130. United States v. Nutrition Serv., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 375, 388 (W.D.
Pa. 1964), affd, 347 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1965).
131. Proponents of laetrile say 80 to 85% of those who use the substance
have already exhausted traditional cancer treatment without obtaining re-
lief or are using it as a mere supplemental means of treatment in conjunction
with more traditional treatment. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1971, at 52, col. 3;
San Diego Union, March 18, 1976, § A, at 8, col. 5.
safe from the standpoint of toxicity 132 but is of questionable
efficacy, arguably the government has no compelling interest in
prohibiting its use as a supplemental remedy. In addition, if a fun-
damental right of privacy is at stake, the government has to show
that the statute is narrowly drawn to reflect only the legitimate in-
terests of the state.
133
The above analysis points out the critical factor of drug safety-
that is, the question of whether the drug is physically safe for
human consumption. If a drug is physically unsafe to ingest, the
government has a strong interest in regulating the substance.
However, because safety is a relative standard, dealing in terms
of safety alone is misleading. Aspirin serves as an example. Con-
sumption of aspirin can produce undesired side-effects, but it is gen-
erally accepted that the beneficial relief afforded by aspirin out-
weighs the risk of harm. In short, the concept of safety must be
analyzed with reference to efficacy. If a fundamental right of pri-
vacy is recognized in health care, courts should weigh the interests
of the government against the interests of the individual in deter-
mining whether an individual may obtain and use certain health-
care drugs. Safety and efficacy are the two primary elements in
determining which party has the greater interest.
People v. Woody134 illustrates the competing interests in an
analogous situation. In that case, the state law at issue proscribed
possession of peyote, a hallucinogenic substance which defendants
used for religious purposes. The court weighed protection of
freedom of religion against the state's interest in protection of
health. Religious expression was found to be the superior interest
because use of peyote presented only a slight danger to the user
and the state.'3 5
A test similar to that employed in Woody can be utilized when
the fundamental right at stake is privacy in the area of health care.
It is reasonable to afford greater protection to the individual's right
to obtain and use a health-care drug of questionable efficacy as
recognition of the drug's effectiveness is shown to increase. How-
ever, as recognition of purported effectiveness lessens, the individu-
al's interest in health care lessens, and the state can more- easily
counter the individual's interest on the basis of questionable
safety.
3 6
132. Toxicity means that the substance has adverse physical effects upon
the user.
133. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
134. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
135. Id. at 727, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
136. See § 201(c), 21 U.S.C. § 811 (c) (1970), which outlines a balancing
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This type of analysis raises the question of the court's jurisdiction
to consider the safety and efficacy of drugs. It is generally assumed
that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has primary juris-
diction over determining the safety and efficacy of drugs, 137 but
at least one court has made findings on its own,138 and other
courts impliedly have questioned the FDA's primary jurisdiction.
13 9
A person seeking to obtain a substance like laetrile may not have
time to go through the normal process of having the FDA make
a determination of the drug's safety and effectiveness. An individ-
ual should be able to seek immediate relief in court. When such
relief is sought, a court need not make any final determination of
safety and efficacy in upholding a right to obtain and use health-
care drugs by virtue of this balancing test. Rather, the court could
merely determine whether a genuine difference of opinion exists
over the drug's safety. The standard employed by the court for
testing safety would be similar to the "generally recognized" stand-
ard in section 201 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.140 If there
test for determining whether a specific drug or substance should be con-
trolled or removed from the schedules provided in that chapter. Factors
for the drug include (1) its actual or relative potential for abuse, (2) sci-
entific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known, (3) the state of cur-
rent scientific knowledge regarding the drug, (4) what, if any, risk there
is to the public health, and (5) its psychic or physiological dependence lia-
bility.
137. Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Rutherford v. American Medical Ass'n, 379 F.2d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1043 (1968); Tutoki v. Celebreeze, 375 F.2d 105, 107
(7th Cir. 1967); Lemmon Pharmacal Co. v. Richardson, 319 F. Supp. 375,
377 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412
U.S. 645, 652 (1973). Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570,
574 (1952), explained the doctrine of primary jurisidiction: In cases raising
issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or in cases
requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Con-
gress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over.
138. Rutherford v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (W.D. Okla.
1975), remanded, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976) (specific finding that
laetrile is non-toxic when used in moderate amounts). See United States
v. An Article or Device. . . "Hubbard Electrometer," 333 F. Supp. 357, 359
(D.D.C. 1971) (Court found that the device had no medical or scientific
worth even though FDA had not determined its safety or effectiveness.).
139. See Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1973) (In
some cases general recognition that a drug is effective might be made with-
out the kind of scientific support- necessary to obtain approval of an NDA.);
Pfizer, Inc. v. Richardson, 434 F.2d 536, 543 (2d Cir. 1970) (A controversy
over the efficacy of a particular drug raises an issue of adjudicative fact.);
United States v. Allan Drug Corp., 357 F.2d 713, 719-20 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966) (Court infers that it could speculate on the ef-
fective uses of a drug.).
140. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 2 0 1(p) (1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1)
is a difference of opinion over the drug's safety, the drug may be
regulated or absolutely proscribed unless the proponent can show
significant recognition of the drug's effectiveness or unless the
safety interest is minimal in comparison to the individual privacy
interest. If the drug is recognized as dangerous, 141 it may be pro-
scribed unless the proponent can show significant recognition of
the drug's effectiveness against life-threatening diseases. The "sig-
nificant-recognition" test for efficacy could be based on a re-
spected minority opinion of the medical and scientific commu-
nity.
142
The competing interests can be analyzed with respect to four
classes of health-care drugs distinguished by safety and efficacy
recognition factors.
1 43
(1) Drugs of recognized safety, recognized effectiveness. The
government has no legitimate interest in proscribing these drugs
because there is neither a question of safety nor a threat of
reliance on an ineffective drug.144 Furthermore, the individual has
an overriding interest to use this type of drug for protecting his
personal health and well-being.
(2) Drugs of recognized safety, unrecognized effectiveness. The
government interest is to prevent reliance by users who to their
(1970). See note 50 supra. Under this test, the actual safety of the drug
is not in issue; the issue is one of general recognition of the drug.
141. A dangerous drug is a substance such as those defined in the sched-
ules of section 202(b) (1) & (2), 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (1) & (2) (1970). These
drugs have a high potential for abuse and their use is not accepted as safe.
A mildly unsafe drug is a lesser health hazard. See generally Rutherford
v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137, 1142 n.4 (10th Cir. 1976); Oppenheimer v.
Sterling Drug., Inc., 7 Ohio App. 2d 103, 107, 219 N.E.2d 54, 57 (1964).
142. The term significant recognition is comparable, but not as demand-
ing, as the generally-recognized standard used in determining whether a
substance is a new drug. See notes 50 & 140 supra. The primary difference
is that significant recognition is not intended to require majority recognition
of efficacy. Rather, it requires only a respected minority opinion of experts
who have based their conclusions on adequate and well-controlled investi-
gations, even if those investigations are not positively conclusive. The sig-
nificant-recognition standard is necessary to avoid the conflicting, and often
harsh, views taken about the interpretation of the term generally recog-
nized. See United States v. Article of Drug . . . "Mykocert," 345 F. Supp.
571, 574-75 (N.D. Ill. 1972). There the court acknowledged that "difficulty
has been encountered by the Courts in determining precisely what degree
of recognition both in quantity and quality constitutes 'general recognition'
under the statute .... "
143. The classifications of "recognized safety" and "recognized effective-
ness" are based on recognition, not actual safety or actual effectiveness.
The standards employed, unless otherwise specified, are general recognition
for safety and significant evidence for efficacy; see notes 140 & 142 supra.
144. Even though the government may have no legitimate interest in the
proscription of these drugs, it may have an interest in their regulation to
assure their proper use.
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detriment might refrain from beneficial treatment. However, this
interest would not be applicable to those using the drug to combat
mild ailments 145 or those who use the drug as supplemental treat-
ment for any type of disease. Because safety is not a factor, people
using this type of drug for cure of a mild ailment, such as a common
cold, would have an interest in their autonomy of health care supe-
rior to any legitimate government interest. Those who use the drug
as supplemental treatment for more serious diseases would also
have the superior interest if such a class of users could be readily
distinguished from other users. In other words, the question is
whether the statute can effectively serve the legitimate government
interest of protecting against detrimental reliance without includ-
ing the class of supplemental users.
14 6
(3) Drugs of unrecognized safety, recognized effectiveness. The
government's interest in proscribing such substances is the safety
factor, while the individual's interest in obtaining such drugs is the
curative factor. To balance the interests of the government and
of the individual, safety must be weighed against the type of cura-
tive value afforded by the drug. Thus, a truly dangerous drug
could be proscribed if it were not intended to treat a life-threaten-
ing disease. 147  However, a life-saving drug could not be pro-
scribed even if considered dangerous, although regulation would
certainly be appropriate. 48  In general, as recognition of danger
increases, an individual will be required to demonstrate a greater
145. See United States v. Article of Drug Labeled "Quick-O-Ver," 274
F. Supp. 443, 449 (D. Md. 1967); United States v. Article of Drug Labeled
"Decholin," 264 F. Supp. 473, 482-83 (E.D. Mich. 1967). Both cases held
that when a drug is designed for use against everyday ailments such as
a headache and upset stomach and only the efficacy is in dispute, the gov-
ernment does not have a legitimate claim in saying that the user will be
harmed by any delay induced by the taking of the ineffective drug.
146. This issue is discussed in the text accompanying notes 155-58 infra.
147. See In re Yun Quong, 159 Cal. 508, 114 P. 835 (1911); In re Halla-
well, 8 Cal. App. 563, 97 P. 320 (1908) (where drugs considered dangerous
were subject to complete proscription despite known medicinal benefits not
of the life-saving variety).
148. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973), the Supreme Court said
that the state retains a definite interest in protecting the woman's own
health and safety when an abortion is proposed at a late stage in pregnancy,
but that an abortion may be performed if necessary to save the woman's
life. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1904), the Court indi-
cated that the state's interest in protecting health must yield if such action
would take the life of the person being vaccinated. Both decisions imply
that the government's interest in protecting health must yield to the life-
saving interest of the individual.
personal interest, primarily by showing recognition of effectiveness
for the treatment of life-threatening diseases.
(4) Drugs of unrecognized safety, unrecognized effectiveness.
The safety factor gives the government a strong interest to pro-
scribe, while lack of recognized effectiveness gives a strong govern-
ment interest against use by those relying on such a drug for treat-
ing life-threatening diseases. As in class (2) above, two groups
of people could assert countervailing interests to the government's
interest in proscribing such substances because of lack of efficacy:
(a) those who use the drug as an exclusive remedy tW combat mild
ailments, and (b) those who use the drug as supplemental treatment
for any type of disease. The questionable safety of a drug can offset
an individual's personal interest in using such a substance for a mild
ailment because of the government's interest in preventing self-
harm. 49 Only when the individual's personal interest reaches the
magnitude of life-determining consequences, will it be appropriate
to find that the individual's interest is comparable to the govern-
ment's interest. Thus, when a substance is being used to combat
a life-threatening disease, an individual may be able to claim an
interest superior to the government's safety interest. The appropri-
ate test for people wishing to take drugs of unrecognized safety
and efficacy as supplemental treatment for a life-threatening
disease would seem to be one of balancing the possibility of harm
against the possibility of cure. For instance, a dangerous drug with
a nearly absolute lack of recognition for its effectiveness would
clearly give the government a superior interest. However, a drug
which is recognized as only mildly unsafe, but for which some
recognition of effectiveness exists (not reaching the level of signifi-
cant recognition of effectiveness), would probably be made avail-
able to the individual wishing to use it as supplemental treatment
for a life-threatening disease.
Application of this analysis to laetrile by weighing the govern-
ment's interests against the individual's interests is illustrative.
There seems to be a genuine difference of opinion over the ques-
tion of whether laetrile is safe. Some have said laetrile is safe for
use in moderate amounts, 150 while others have found harmful
149. See cases cited in note 72 supra, in which courts said that so long as
a rational basis exists for concluding marijuana is harmful to personal
health, marijuana possession may be made illegal. The rational belief in
danger outweighs personal health interests because of the absence of indica-
tion that the drug may prove beneficial.
150. Rutherford v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1214-15 (W.D. Okla.
1975), remanded, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976); M. CULBERT, VITAMIN B17,
at 89-90 (1974).
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effects. 151 Furthermore, even though laetrile has some vocifer-
ous proponents, the drug does not meet the standard of "significant
recognition" for its effective worth.152  Thus, laetrile falls into
class (4), a drug of unrecognized safety, unrecognized effectiveness.
Because it is intended for treatment of cancer, a life-threatening
disease, only those using it as supplemental treatment could
possibly offset the government's interest in preventing detrimental
reliance. 153 The test then becomes one of balancing the possibil-
ity of harm (mildly toxic) against the possibility of cure (very
limited recognition). Although laetrile presents a difficult ques-
tion, it seems that the stronger interest rests with the individual
who desires to use laetrile as a supplemental treatment. The
government interest in protecting the individual against harm from
toxic effects of laetrile does not appear as great as the individual's
right of privacy in obtaining and using this health-care drug.
154
However, the question remains of whether a statute can be drawn
to serve a compelling interest in protecting against detrimental reli-
ance on drugs of unproven effectiveness without including the class
of supplemental users.
NEcESSARY MEANS OF REGULATION
In Roe v. Wade,155 the Supreme Court held that when funda-
mental rights are involved, regulation of those rights may be justi-
fied only by statutes that are narrowly drawn to express the
151. United States v. General Research Laboratories, Inc., 397 F. Supp.
197, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1975); 39 CONSUMER REPORT 514 (1974).
152. The recognition of laetrile as an effective cure of cancer is not signif-
icant enough to meet the standard detailed in note 142 supra. Apparently
most of the claims of effectiveness stem from personal experiences, not clin-
ical studies.
153. It must be remembered that the government has a legitimate inter-
est in protecting an individual against self-harm. E.g., note 126 supra, con-
cerning the government's interest in requiring people to wear motorcycle
helmets to protect motorcyclists against the mere possibility of self-harm.
In the same respect, the government has an interest in protecting people
against reliance on drugs of unproven efficacy as their sole remedy against
a life-threatening disease. Even if the individual believes he will not get
into a motorcycle accident or believes that a laetrile-type drug will cure
his disease, the government has a valid interest in protecting against that
possibility of self-harm.
154. This reference is made only to the rights of the individual who uses
the drug. It does not necessarily follow that the same rights are held by
physicians or distributors.
155. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Even if a state's intrusion is justified, the
means utilized must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achiev-
ing the same basic purpose. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
compelling state interests at stake. In the instance of health-care
drugs of questionable efficacy, a compelling state interest can be
shown because an individual might take a drug of unproven
effectiveness for a serious disease in lieu of traditional methods of
treatment. 156 People seeking a laetrile-type drug as a purely
supplemental means of treatment, fully aware of its questionable
effectiveness, are not within the ambit of any compelling interest.
The question becomes whether statutes could be more narrowly
drawn to serve this compelling state interest without including the
class of supplemental users.
As an alternative to the federal Act's complete prohibition of
laetrile-type drugs in interstate commerce or a state statute's pro-
prohibition against administration, such drugs might be made avail-
able on a strictly regulated basis. One authority has suggested that
laetrile be distributed by a government commission in order to
assure that laetrile users are also receiving traditional cancer treat-
ment.157 Another form of regulation would be to make a laetrile-
type drug available only on a tightly controlled prescription basis,
leaving it to the physician's judgment to determine whether such
a drug is appropriate. 158 If a drug like laetrile is made available
through regulated professional channels, rather than only through
underground markets, the laetrile user will probably be exposed
to truly beneficial medical care. Furthermore, strict misbranding
and advertising standards would remain to protect all users from
false and misleading claims by distributors, with warnings of the
unproven effectiveness. In this sense, the federal and state statutes
could be more narrowly drawn to respect an individual's right of
privacy in personal health care while protecting on a limited basis
a person's right to obtain and use certain drugs of questionable
efficacy.
156. See note 129 supra.
157. Dr. Harold A. Harper, professor of biochemistry at the University
of California, San Francisco, School of Medicine, suggested that laetrile
might be administered by a government agency in order to control distribu-
tion more effectively. Dr. Harper stated that he considers laetrile useless
in the cure of cancer but suggested that regulated distribution would elim-
inate the profit-motive and convince cancer patients to obtain traditional
cancer treatment. San Diego Union, Sept. 30, 1976, § B, at 1, col. 1.
158. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 503(b) (1), 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)
(1) (1970), requiring that certain categories of drugs be dispensed only
upon the prescription of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such
drugs. Under the present system, a laetrile user probably can obtain the
drug through illicit channels and without the supervision of a qualified
physician. If laetrile were maae available through legal channels, laetrile
users would be under much closer medical supervision. Furthermore, a
physician might be unwilling to administer laetrile because of the malprac-
tice risk and might be able to convince the patient of its unproven effective-
ness.
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COLLATERAL RIGHTS
It is clear that if an individual is successful in asserting a right
to obtain and use an unapproved drug like laetrile, manufacturers
will claim a right to distribute the substance, physicians will claim
a right to prescribe and administer it, and pharmacists will claim
a right to dispense it. Distributors and physicians can attack drug
laws in two distinct ways: They can claim an independent right
to distribute and administer the substance, and they can claim
standing to assert rights held by users of the drug.
Constitutional protection of economic interests has fallen into
disfavor in recent years, and courts could not be expected to find
a fundamental right of commercial distributors or pharmacists to
distribute certain health-care drugs. 5 9 Thus, the right to dis-
tribute may be restricted by any law bearing a rational relationship
to a permissible state objective. 160
Physicians may claim that their right to administer such sub-
stances falls within the scope of privacy protecting the physician-
patient relationship or within the scope of a physician's discretion
in the practice of medicine.' 6 ' The medical profession, however,
has long been subject to government regulation. 62  In addition,
recent decisions have held that in order to protect public health
and safety the state may limit a physician's authority to prescribe
drugs for a patient. 63 Protection of the patient requires that a
physician be subject to certain medical standards in administering
treatment. Privacy in health care should be dependent upon the
individual's decisionmaking and should not encompass the entire
159. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). One authority has said that no claim
of substantive economic rights would be sustained by the Supreme Court.
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34, 38. See also note 64 supra.
160. See authorities cited note 159 supra.
161. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 219 (1973) (Douglas, J., con-
curring).
162. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
163. People v. Nunn, 46 Cal. 2d 460, 469, 296 P.2d 813, 818, cert. denied,
352 U.S. 883 (1956) (Court held that the legislature may deprive a doctor
of the right to prescribe for certain patients.); Blinder v. Division of Nar-
cotic Enforcement, 25 Cal. App. 3d 174, 181-82, 101 Cal. Rptr. 635, 640 (1972)
(State has the right to regulate administration of drugs, and physicians are
granted certain privileges respecting administration of drugs, but this priv-
ilege is not absolute as the state has the power to regulate professions in
the interest of public health and safety.). See Felber v. Foote, 321 F. Supp.
85, 88 (D. Conn. 1970) (doctor required to report drug dependent patients).
physician-patient relationship. 64 While neither distributor nor
physician seemingly has an independent right to administer or dis-
tribute a drug like laetrile, a strong case can be made for asserting
the rights of a third-party user.
The general rule is that a person whose own constitutional rights
are not infringed by a law may not assert the rights of a third party
in challenging the constitutionality of that law.0 5 However, the
Supreme Court has allowed a distributor of contraceptives to assert
the interests of unmarried distributees, 6 an employee to assert
the rights of his employer,0 7 owners of private schools to assert
the rights of their patrons, 0 8 a vendor of property to assert the
rights of a Black vendee in defense to a racially restrictive cove-
nant,169 and an association to assert the rights of its members.
17 0
Those cases indicate that the Court has adopted a factor analysis.
to determine whether one party maintains standing to assert rights
of other parties. The most important factors appear to be the na-
ture of the right being asserted, the ability of the other party
to assert the right himself, and the type of relationship between
the parties.
Third-party standing will not be available when the right at stake
is a mere contractual or property right.171 The cases in which
the Supreme Court has granted third-party standing reveal that
an important personal right of the third party, such as education
of children or the equal protection rights of Blacks, was in issue.
The privacy right of the health-drug user is a similar type of per-
sonal right and thus meets the first criterion.
164. Cf. Act of Sept. 19, 1976, Pub. Law No. -, 1976, Alaska Sess. Laws
ch. 227, which provides that no health facility may interfere with the physi-
cian-patient relationship by restricting or forbidding the use of laetrile
when prescribed or administered by a physician and requested by a patient
unless laetrile is found to be harmful. Significantly, the statute, in allowing
laetrile to be administered, requires that the patient request laetrile treat-
ment. In other words, the patient's individual decision is the important ele-
ment in the physician-patient relationship which is worthy of protection.
165. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973); McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 429-30 (1961); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21-22
(1960).
166. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972).
167. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1915).
168. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925).
169. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 258 (1953).
170. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958).
171. Sedler, Standing To Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme
Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 646-47 (1962). This test is of course very subjec-
tive, and the importance of the right being asserted depends in part on the
equities of the case. The rule denying standing to raise another's rights
is only a rule of practice; it may and should be disregarded whenever neces-
sary for effective attainment of justice. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,
257 (1953).
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Because interstate transportation of unapproved health-care
drugs for personal use is prohibited by the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, the laetrile user has the ability to assert rights in
behalf of himself. Thus, the Court will have little desire to allow
a distributor to assert the user's rights. This situation differs from
Eisenstadt v. Baird, in which the statute prohibited only distribu-
tion of contraceptives to single people, thereby impairing their pri-
vacy rights without subjecting them to prosecution. 172 The dis-
tributors were afforded standing to assert the privacy interests
because the individuals had no way of asserting their privacy
rights. 73 The state statutes proscribing administration of laetrile
for cancer treatment do not afford the laetrile user any opportunity
to assert his privacy rights because only the one administering the
drug is subject to prosecution. A person administering laetrile
therefore has a stronger argument for asserting the user's rights.
The critical factor in the standing issue is the type of relation-
ship enjoyed by the parties. A purely commercial relationship
alone should not enable a distributor to assert the rights held by
the user-distributee because of its impersonal, non-confidential, and
fortuitous nature. 74 In Eisenstadt, where the Supreme Court
allowed the distributor to assert the distributee's rights, consider-
able emphasis was placed on the special relationship between the
distributor and distributee.175 The Court saw their encounter as
encompassing more than a mere commercial transaction. To the
extent that a significant rather than a fortuitous relationship can
be shown, standing should be granted to the distributor under the
Eisenstadt rationale. However, it seems unlikely that the ordinary
distributors of laetrile will be able to prove a special relationship
with the ultimate distributee. In one case, the distributors of
laetrile were alleged to be part of a multi-million dollar opera-
tion, 76 a marked contrast to the personal relationship which
Baird enjoyed with the distributee in Eisenstadt.
172. 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972).
173. Id.
174. Sedler, supra note 171, at 647.
175. 405 U.S. at 445. The Court stated:
[T]he relationship between Baird and those whose rights he seeks
to assert is not simply that between a distributor and potential
distributees, but that between an advocate of the rights of persons
to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so. The very
point of Baird's giving away the vaginal foam was to challenge
the Massachusetts statute that limited access to contraceptives.
176. United States v. McNaughton, Cr. No. 7600448 (S.D. Cal., filed May
20, 1976).
While the relationship between distributor and distributee may
be viewed in an impersonal, commercial sense, the physician-patient
relationship has enjoyed special status in the eyes of the law.
171
The special intimacy of the relationship appears adequate justifica-
tion for allowing the physician to assert the rights of the pa-
tient.178 In Griswold v. Connecticut,17 the Supreme Court held
that in attacking an anti-contraception statute, the executive di-
rector of Planned Parenthood and a physician who gave informa-
tion, instruction, and medical advice to married couples about
contraception had standing to raise the constitutional rights of
married people with whom they had a professional relationship.
One authority asserts that when a party to a professional relation-
ship is adversely affected by action dealing with the subject matter
of the relationship, he should have standing to assert that the con-
stitutional rights of the other party to the relationship are infringed
upon by such action. 80 If physicians are allowed to assert the
rights of their patients and if the courts recognize a right of privacy
in using certain drugs of questionable efficacy, physicians should
not be prosecuted under state statutes forbidding the administra-
tion of certain substances. This conclusion, of course, assumes that
a patient is in the position to assert a personal health-care right
and is not being administered a substance like laetrile as the exclu-
sive means of treatment.
RECENT LAETRILE DEVELOPMENT
Even as this article goes to press, the controversy surrounding
laetrile continues to grow. Another federal district court has fol-
lowed the lead of the Rutherford decision' s ' by granting a prelim-
inary injunction against the FDA in order to allow a terminally
ill cancer patient to transport limited amounts of laetrile in inter-
state commerce for his personal use. 8 2 The court concluded that
177. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 990-1007 (West Supp. 1976), listing laws
dealing with the physician-patient privilege.
178. Singleton v. Wulff, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 2875 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)
(cases allowing physicians to assert the rights of their patients). But see
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 126-27 (1973); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44
(1943).
179. 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
180. Sedler, supra note 171, at 649-50. He emphasizes that the relation-
ship must be professional, similar to that enjoyed between physician and
patient, as distinct from purely commercial.
181. Rutherford v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Okla. 1975),
remanded, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976).
182. Carnohan v. United States, Civ. No. 77-0010 (S.D. Cal., Jan. 21,
1977). See Los Angeles Times, Jan. 29, 1977, pt. II, at 1, col. 1; San Diego
Union, Jan. 22, 1977, § B, at 1, col. 3. The preliminary injunction proved to
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"[t]o deny such a person his freedom of choice, when there are
no other remedies presently available, would appear grossly pater-
nalistic .... 183
CONCLUSION
The most practical approach for a person wishing to obtain and
use an unapproved health-care drug is to show that a certain sub-
stance falls outside particular provisions of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and is therefore not subject to the Act's pre-market-
ing requirements. However, such a showing ordinarily cannot be
made, and it may be necessary to use a constitutional argument
to achieve those objectives. The most feasible constitutional argu-
ment is to demonstrate the existence of a fundamental right of
privacy in the area of health care.
If a fundamental right is at stake, the appropriate standard of
review is strict scrutiny. Under this standard, the government's
interest in health and safety cannot offset the individual's privacy
interest when a drug of questionable efficacy is used merely as a
supplemental treatment. Therefore, statutes regulating drugs of
questionable efficacy should be more narrowly drawn so as not
to infringe upon the rights of supplemental users of a drug
like laetrile. Making such drugs available through professionally
staffed agencies would satisfy the health-care rights of these
individuals, while removing the uncertainty and mystery surround-
ing unapproved health cures. Such an approach would improve the
current system by assuring that users of laetrile-type drugs receive
complete and competent medical treatment.
ROBERT J. MILIS
be a Pyrrhic legal victory for plaintiff Carnohan; he died of cancer only 22
days after the order was granted. San Diego Union, Feb. 14, 1977, § B, at 1,
col. 5.
183. Carnohan v. United States, Civ. No. 770010, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Cal.,
Jan. 21, 1977). But see Morgan v. Mathews, Civ. No. 76-1637 (D.S.C., Nov.
30, 1976) (injunction to transport laetrile in interstate commerce denied).
